Industrial Security

Vejen til implementering

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Safty IEC61508-1

7.4 Hazard and risk analysis

7.4.2.3 The hazards, hazardous events and hazardous situations of the EUC and the EUC control system shall be determined under all reasonably foreseeable circumstances (including fault conditions, reasonably foreseeable misuse and malevolent or unauthorised action). This shall include all relevant human factor issues, and shall give particular attention to abnormal or infrequent modes of operation of the EUC. If the hazard analysis identifies that malevolent or unauthorised action, constituting a security threat, as being reasonably foreseeable, then a security threats analysis should be carried out.

NOTE 1 For reasonably foreseeable misuse see 3.1.14 of IEC 61508-4.

NOTE 2 For guidance on hazard identification including guidance on representation and analysis of human factor issues, see reference [11] in the bibliography.

NOTE 3 For guidance on security risks analysis, see IEC 62443 series.

NOTE 4 Malevolent or unauthorised action covers security threats.

Agenda





Hvordan kommer man i gang?



Caught between regulation, requirements, and standards

BDSG





NERC CIP



ISO 27032

ANSSI

IEC 62443

ISA 99




NIST


National Institute of Standards and Technology



gives us the ability to **communicate** in an **unambiguous** way



based on a **holistic** Defense in depth concept





Focus on the **interfaces** between all stakeholders


Operator,
Integrators, and
Manufacturers

SIEMENS



SIEMENS

provides system design guidelines



Addresses the entire life cycle



provides a complete

Cyber Security Management System

Risk analysis

Business rationale

Risk identification classification and assessment



Risk management and implementation System development and maintenance

Information and document management

Incident planning and response

Access control

Personnel security

Physical and environmental security

Network segmentation

Account administration

Autentification

Authorization

CSMS scope

Organization for security

Staff training and security awareness

Business continuity plan

Security policies and procedures

Conformance


Review, improve and maintain the CSMS

Monitoring and improving the CSMS

Risk methods and frameworks




"A good overview"



More info: <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-risk-management-collection/component-system-driven-approaches/understanding-component-driven-ap

Getting started

The IEC62443/ISO27001 based method



Protection Levels are the key criteria and cover security functionalities and processes

Security process

- Based on IEC 62443-2-4 and ISO27001
- Maturity Level 1 4



Protection Level (PL)

Security functions

- Based on IEC 62443-3-3
- Security Level 1 4







Protection Levels

PL 1 Protection against **casual** or coincidental violation Protection against intentional violation using simple means PL 2 with low resources, generic skills and low motivation Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated PL 3 means with moderate resources, IACS specific skills and moderate motivation Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, IACS specific skills and high PL 4 motivation

Hvilke konkrete erfaringer har vi

fået undervejs





Industrial Security Implementation hierarchy

Intrusion Prevention

Intrusion detection

Anomaly detection

Logging & Monitoring

Assessment

Central User Management

Micro Segmentation

Vulnerability Management

Patching

Com. based on certificates

Cell protection

Encryption

Hardening

Firewalls

Network Management

IDMZ

Passwords

Segmentation

Managed Network Components

Backup & Restore

Separation of IT/OT

A piece of a bigger picture

IEC 61508 The Functional Safety standard ISO27001 Well known ITsecurity standard Risk assessment The OT-security IEC62443 framework standard **NIST 800-30**

SIEMENS



HVOT finder man inspiration?

The IEC 62443 structure

General

1-1 Terminology, concepts and models

1-2 Master glossary of terms and abbreviations

1-3 System security compliance metrics

1-4 IACS security lifecycle and use-cases

Policies and procedures

2-1 Security program requirements for IACS asset owners

2-2 IACS security program ratings

2-3 Patch management in the IACS environment 2-4 Security program requirements for IACS service providers

System

3-1 Security technologies for IACS

3-2 Security risk assessment and system design

3-3 System security requirements and security levels

Components 4-1 Secure product development lifecycle requirements

4-2 Technical security requirements for IACS components

Definition and metrics

Processes / procedures


Functional requirements

Operational Guidelines for Industrial Security



https://cert-portal.siemens.com/operational-guidelines-industrial-security.pdf

IEC 62443-3-2 Complaint Blueprint



https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/109780322/cybersecurity-defense-in-depth-concept-for-the-water-and-waste-water-industry?dti=0&lc=en-WW

Se meget mere på: www.siemens.dk/di-webinarer

